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INTRODUCTION 
John Manley 
BEFORE 1937 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) investigations of 
"Revolutionary Organizations and Agitation in Canada" were concerned 
almost solely with the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). During 1937, 
however, as the present volume reveals, the RCMP divided its gaze to encom-
pass the Committee for Industrial Organization (ClO). The Force acknow-
ledged that the party and the cio were distinct and separate entities, but its 
reports on "CIO Activities and Industrial Unrest" doggedly pointed out to the 
other branches of the state how the party's fingerprints were all over the 
emerging labour centre. Consciously or unconsciously, it contributed to the 
contemporary demonization of the CIO. If much of what it reported was 
apparently culled from no more subversive a source than the Labour Gazette, 
students of the period may be thankful that the Force did not always rely on 
low-level scanning of the press. Its ferretings shed welcome light on an 
important but under-researched period. I will use the rest of this introduction 
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to tease out some of what the 1937 Bulletins have to say on why the party grew 
in the late 1930s, whether its new line took it to the right, and whether the 
Popular Front opened up the possibility of a Canadian Road to Socialism. 
I 
It was obvious to the RCMP that its old enemy was thriving. After hitting 
rock-bottom in 1931 at around 1400 members, the party started to recover 
during the remainder of the generally reviled Class Against Class period and 
by mid-1934 reached a membership of 5,500, more than it had ever boasted. 
Growth accelerated during the Popular Front. Membership doubled between 
July 1935 and October 1937, rising from 7,390 to 15,000, with a growth rate 
of roughly 200 members a month in 1934-35, 250 a month in 1935-1936, and 
300 a month in early 1937. The party opened its doors, as East Toronto 
organizer Jack Scott put it, to "anybody ... who wanted to come in." Most 
new members came from the unemployed movement or — in much fewer 
numbers — the labour unions. While recruits from the unemployed move-
ment made the party more "Canadian" than in the 1920s, it remained over-
whelmingly European-born. The ethnic distribution of Winnipeg's 
membership in mid-1937 had a familiar look: the 715 members were 42 per 
cent Ukrainian or Russian, 14 per cent Jewish, 12.6 per cent Polish, 14.4 per 
cent Scandinavian, German or Hungarian, and 17 percent Anglo-Saxon-only 
22 per cent of Southern Ontario recruits in 1937-38 were native bom. The 
resistance of second-generation immigrants to the party was one of the reasons 
underlying the makeover of pro-communist national language organizations 
along Popular Front lines. Several changed their names in 1936-37. Thus, for 
example, the Polish Labour Farmer Temple Association became the Polish 
Revival started thanks to the success of the Workers' Unify League's mass campaign 
for state non-contributory unemployment insurance between February and June 1931. 
Although there was almost certainly a decline in the remainder of that year, due to 
mounting state attacks on the party and its unemployed associations, recovery clearly 
resumed during the WUL's heyday of 1933-34. 
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People's Association and the Jugoslavian Woricers' Clubs were broken down 
into the Serbian People's Movement and the Croatian Cultural Association, 
the better to promote "the national traditions of their people." In the manner 
of the party centre, some language organizations also retitled their journals. 
The most influential ethnic newspaper, the weekly Ukrayinski Robitnychi Visli 
(Ukrainian Labour News), became the daily Narodna Hazetta {People's 
Gazette) in September 1937.^ 
For the first time since the early 1920s, holding the Soviet franchise was 
advantageous. The party's invitation to join the Soviet-led campaign for 
international anti-fascism resonated with Canadians of liberal disposition and 
conscience, and a sizeable number of new members entered from the "pro-
gressive" middle class. As American historian Maurice Isserman observes, not 
"everyone could pour cement for the Dnepropetrovsk Dam or stand guard with 
a rifle in Madrid's trenches; Communist party membership offered a vicarious 
sense of participation in both." Just as important, the party provided oppor-
tunities in one or other of its "fronts" for a growing and socially diverse 
periphery of Canadians, not yet ready or willing to become members, to 
express in practical ways their concern for a more democratic Canada and a 
safer world. The Popular Front mobilized them around a myriad group of 
actions. Solidarity with Republican Spain, for example, could be expressed by 
gathering 100,000 cigarettes or knitting socks for the lads at the front, by 
donating time — one group of garment workers contributed new suits of 
clothes to be raffled — or simply money. Thousands of collecting-tins rattled 
for Spain, calling for contributions towards such humanitarian projects as the 
upkeep of a Canadian-sponsored school for Civil War orphans and Dr. 
Norman Bethune's mobile blood-transfusion unit. 
^Bulletin M840, 20 January 1937; *842, 3 February 1937. See also. University of 
Toronto, Robert Kenny Papers, Box 2, folder 6, "Memorandum on the Work of the 
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behind Muni Ehrlich's rebirth as "Jack Taylor," the RCMP seemed gratified that the 
party still had to practice bogus Canadianization. 
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The RCMP noted how the party was attempting to broaden its appeal by 
consciously attuning itself to national values and symbols. If there was a 
single dominant signifier of the Popular Front, it was Bethune's ambulance 
unit, which the party turned into an icon of native humanitarianism and 
ingenuity. Bethune. the Daily Clarion editorialized, was vindicating the 
"Nation's Honor." In an interview Tim Buck linked honour, nation, solidar-
ity, sacrifice and patriotism in the space of six lines: "We Canadians have done 
something to aid our Spanish brothers and sisters; but not enough by far ... 
But, let us be clear that we Canadians have only made the first few small steps 
towards the fulfilment of our sacred obligations to the Spanish people ... I am 
convinced that our Canadian people are ready and willing to exert the supreme 
efforts so vitally necessary." "Canada," the party leader concluded, "must do 
her share." At their most important meetings communists emphasized their 
Canadian-ness by steadfastly refusing to sing "God Save the King" while 
wrapping themselves in the flag. Behind the platform at the Alberta provincial 
convention was a "large maple leaf with Tim Buck's picture in the centre," 
while at the Eighth Dominion convention the backdrop was "a huge banner 
depicting a young Canadian worker with a wife and child standing before a 
green maple leaf on which were drawn symbols of the wealth of Canada: 
lumber, wheat, factories, mines." The banner carried the message that "Our 
Country is Rich Enough to Make Our People Happy." Not content to let 
these patriotic symbols speak for themselves, the party sought out new 
audiences and spoke to them on the issues they considered important and in 
language they could understand. When party representative G. [Sam?] Walsh 
addressed the Kitchener YMCA, his audience's four key questions were: was 
the CPC compatible with democracy? did it seek to destroy Christianity? what 
were its ultimate aims? and how did it intend to achieve them? An informant 
reported that he responded "in a capable fashion." 
The RCMP paid close attention to the party's fishing expedition into the 
middle class. A mole in the Montréal Young Communist League (YCL) 
reported that the McGill University unit continued to be a productive source 
of new recruits. Some of these student recruits may have remained sympa-
The Force recognized what the party was up to. Its report on Buck's interview was 
headed: "Communists Acting as Representatives of [the] Canadian People," Bulletin 
0839, 13 January 1937. For another comment in similar vein, sec Bulletin 0862, 30 
June 1937. 
^'^Bulletin 0839, 13 January 1937. 
^^ Bullet in 0839, 13 January 1937. 
^*Bulletin 0867, 17 August 1938; 0874, 27 October 1937. 
^^Bulletin 0840, 20 January 1937. 
On the party and student politics, see Paul Axelnod, "Spying on the Young in 
Depression and War: Students, Youth Groups, and the RCMP, 1935-1942," Labour/Le 
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thetic after graduation; at a meeting of the Montreal Trade Union Commission, 
a delegate submitted a list of 90 professional contacts, mainly architects and 
engineers, who had indicated an interest in unionizing. Not all cities pro-
duced so rich a yield, however. Annie Buller complained about the Brandon 
party's lack of inroads among teachers and students. Norman Bethune's 
inspiration apparently left Winnipeg's medical fraternity unmoved; at a ban-
quet in his honour. Dr. S.J. Johannesson regretted that the city's doctors "had 
not come together to honour such a distinguished pioneer of the medical 
profession." The Force logged one bit of evidence that hinted at journalistic 
sympathies with the party's greatest cause célèbre: the British Columbia 
Institute of Journalists sponsored an address on Spain by the left-wing Ameri-
can journalist Anna Louise Strong, editor of Moscow News. 
Of all the professional groups monitored, lawyers had the highest profile. 
They dominated the new front groups the party created explicitly to facilitate 
middle class involvement, such as city and provincial Committees in Aid of 
Spanish Democracy, the Friends of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion (FMPB), 
and especially the Canadian League for Peace and Democracy (CLPD) (ironi-
cally, as this even softer-tincd successor to the League Against War and 
Fascism became the dominant Popular Front agency, the party's original 
vehicle of the "class struggle in the courts," the Canadian Labour Defence 
League (CLDL), continued its slow fade into insignificance). The Bulletins 
record the "fuss" the party made over, and the "great things" it expected from, 
R.L. Calder, K.C., president of the Canadian Civil Liberties Union (CCLU). 
Calder's proclamations of support for capitalism told colleagues that they 
could demonstrate concern for justice and human rights without abandoning 
their class. Jurists like Calder, E.J. MacMurray, K.C., a former Liberal 
Solicitor-General, and Judge Lewis St. George Stubbs must have helped 
legitimate broader bourgeois participation. 
Travail, 35 (1995), 43-63; John Manley, "From United Front to Popular Front: The 
CPC in 1936," introduction to Gregory S. Kealey and Reg Whitaker, eds., R.C.M.P. 
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^''Bulletin 0854, 5 May 1937; Bulletin 0870, 16 September 1937. 
^^Bultetin 0854, 5 May 1937. 
^"^Bulletin 0865, 28 July 1937. 
'^°Bulletin 0850,1 April 1937. 
^'Manley, "From United Front to Popular Front," 4-6; Bulletin 0851, 14 April 1937. 
In A.E. Smith's autobiography, the CLDL simply disappears between 1936 and 1941, 
when it was reincarnated as the National Committee for Democratic Rights. See All 
A/yZ,i/e( 1949; Toronto 1977), 180-205. 
^^Bulletin 0872,5 October 1937; 0875, 4 November 1937; 0877, 30 November 1937. 
The RCMP noted Calder's part in the formation of another front organization, the 
League of the Rights of Man, "the purpose of which ... [was] to watch the politicians, 
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Evaluating the significance of the party's embourgeoisement is difficult. 
The RCMP perceived CLPD activists as dupes manipulated by "well-known ... 
[party] members" on the CLPD National Committee, "but it seems just as likely 
that "front" men and women were aware of the party's agenda. Some middle 
class Canadians may have attended left-wing meetings simply because they 
were events. When André Malraux, the epitome of the creative artist as 
anti-fascist combatant, visited Toronto, Massey Hall had to be booked. Before 
his address, the RCMP noted, he 'was feted at a dinner in the Round Room at 
Eaton's College Street store. Approximately 120 people attended including 
Dr. Salem Bland, Professor Felix Walter and Tim Buck." Movement funds 
were boosted by the sale of signed photographs of the novelist/fighter pilot at 
$10 each (the RCMP report does not comment on the success of this early 
venture into celebrity merchandising). On the other hand, bourgeois cultural 
capital does seem to have facilitated promotion through the party hierarchy. 
Peter Hunter was one of the few YCL leaders in the late 1930s with a proletarian 
background. Most of the party's younger leadership, he notes, "came from 
student and middle-class circles." New bourgeois cadres were entering the 
struggle when the party —its softly, softly approach to sympathizers notwith-
standing — was demanding ever tighter ideological "vigilance" from its own 
rank and file. Bourgeois intellectuals like Stanley Ryerson came under par-
ticular pressure to demonstrate the completeness of theirbreak with liberalism. 
As the hard-line political commissar of the National Training School, Ryerson 
presided over schooling that emphasized devotion to the Soviet Union and 
identified marxism with the latest shading in the party line. 
study the legislation and regain the rights which the people have been losing for the 
past 100 years." On CPC involvement in the Montréal branch of the CCLU, see Larry 
Hannant, The Infernal Machine: Investigating the Loyalty of Canada's Citizens 
(Toronto 1995), 235-37. On McMurray and Stubbs, see Penner. Canadian Commu-
nism, 153-4. 176. 
'^^Bulletin 0850, 7 April 1937. 
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Historical Sciences, Montréal, September 1995. This is not to say that proletarian 
elements were any more tolerant of political deviance. In his attitude towards the 
'Trotskyite" heresy, Peter Hunter fully lived up to his surname. I will have more to say 
on the party's ideological "vigilance" campaigns in the introduction to the final volume 
of The Depression Years scries. For the time being, however, see Bulletin 0845, 24 
February 1937; William Lawson, 'Trotsky and Terrorism," New Frontier, January, 
March 1937; Burnett A. Ward, 'Trotskyism in British Columbia," New Frontier, April 
1937. See the interesting comments on Herbert Norman in Peyton V. Lyon, "The 
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Had the party managed to retain all the members who ever took out party 
cards (which, one Bulletin tells us, members started to carry openly again), it 
would have achieved a membership of over 20,(XX) by 1937-38. The Bulletins 
do not record that the CPC was constantly dogged by the problem of member-
ship "fluctuation." Turnover reached especially high levels during the 
Popular Front, when thousands of Canadians seem to have treated party 
membership like a rite of passage. Historically, fluctuation had been produced 
by a routinized party culture and the costs to personal life of the uniquely high 
level of activity the CPC demanded. These factors were intensified in the 
Popular Front by a blurring of the boundary between party and movement: if 
it was easier for sympathizers to enter the party, it was also easier for them to 
leave. The party's growth spurt ran out of steam in the "Roosevelt recession" 
of late 1937 and 1938, when the 3,0(X) new members who entered the party 
were precisely offset by the 3,000 who left; in British Columbia, in particular, 
the party door was not so much open as revolving. Some new members left 
because they refused to tolerate the gap between the democratic ethos of "The 
Movement" and the party's bureaucratic internal regime. Jack Scott found that 
while some contacts would "sort of thrust themselves upon you," others who 
were "quite militant and quite for the Party ... were not keen on joining." The 
important thing was to be involved in the "struggle of the moment," and that 
could be done without joining the party. One militant informed Scott: "We 
don't need a Party. All we need is for Tim Buck to tell us what to do and then 
go out and do it." This pointed up one of the dangers for the party of 
submerging its identity. Another was pointed up by those who left because 
they resented a directive not to take full credit for their efforts as communists. 
Despite constant reminders, the need to build the party was often over-
looked in the heat and euphoria of the "daily struggles." The sheer weight of 
activity challenged the Leninist truism that struggle was the best educator. 
With the wisdom of hindsight, Scott felt that the party created a long-term 
problem for itself by failing to build a cadre at this time. The "ranks," he 
argued, "had an emotional position, so they drifted in and they drifted out. 
was common to other English-spteaking parties. See Isserman, Which Side Were 
You On?, 149; Kevin Morgan. Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities 
in British Communist Politics, 1935-1941 (Manchester 1989), 10. It may be worth 
pointing out that, in terms of membership, the CPC loses nothing in comparison with 
the CPUSA and CPGB. All three reached their pre-World War II peak in 1938, at which 
point the Canadian party had as many members as the CPGB and between one-quarter 
and one-third of the CPUSA's membership. 
Sam Carr, "Building the Communist Party," A Democratic Front for Canada, 47. 
Carr, "Building the Communist Party," 47-51 ; Palmer, ed., ̂ 4 Communist Life, 50-1. 
The phenomenon of the militant "fellow traveller" was international. See Phil Piratin, 
Our Flag Stays Red (London 1980 [1948]), 5. 
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They were not revolutionaries." This perception is worthy of further exami-
nation, but it needs to be noted that Scott was "all wrapped up in the Spanish 
show" and as frantically active as anyone else. Moreover, the party did try 
to develop cadres. It placed increasing emphasis on formal political education, 
both as a means of brightening up branch life and of strengthening ideological 
convictions. Often, however, its efforts foundered on a pervasive anti-intel-
lectualism that viewed theory and study as lower forms of activity — union 
cadres always seemed to find more pressing tasks — and on the "amateurish, 
accidental and spasmodic" quality of the education itself. 
II 
If the experience of younger Canadian party members was anything like that 
of their American counterparts, many of them must have been happy to "live 
with a policy that was natural, that heeded reality, and that could unleash [their] 
creative talents and energies." Peter Hunter, one of the main organizers of the 
Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, has observed that the Toronto YCL comrades 
who "ate, slept and breathed The Movement" were not motivated by "Eco-
nomic determinism and self interest," but rather by "the desire for social 
justice, for peace, for a new world." All of those chosen for mass work. Hunter 
remembers, had an "ability to work with others, to recognize the other point 
of view, to compromise when necessary." The party, of course, was always 
supposed to "come first," but for Hunter — and surely for others like him — 
The Movement's imperatives sometimes prevailed. 
A section of the rank and file, however, clearly felt that the drive for popular 
unity against fascism was imposing too many compromises on the class 
struggle. Their unhappiness about the leadership's direction can be inferred 
28 
Palmer, A Communist Life, 38. 
After the 1937 convention, the party produced five "Branch Study Outlines" which 
formed the basis of its political education programme for the next year. They guided 
members through the five pamphlets produced to popularize the general party pro-
gramme: Tim Buck, The People versus Monopoly; Sam Carr, Communists at Work; 
Earl Browder, North America and the Soviet Union (a rudimentary rehash of a pamphlet 
originally written for the CPUSA): CPC, We Propose (an outline of the programme), 
and Evariste Dubé, French Canada Awakes. See copies in University of Toronto, 
Kenny Collection, Box 2, folder 4. On the growth of party schools, see Bulletin #838, 
6 January 1937; #844, 17 February 1937; #879. 22 December 1937. The RCMP's 
silence on the National Training School, after noting its inauguration, suggests, 
perhaps, that the party may have taken unusual measures to maintain the school's 
privacy. On the NTS, see Manley, 'Teaching and Learning." The critical view of party 
education is in Carr, "Building the Communist Party," 51. 
George Chamey, quoted in Isserman, Which Side Were You On?, xii; Hunter Which 
Side Are You On, Boys?, 109, 117. 
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from an "educational letter" sent out in January 1937. In defending "bourgeois 
democracy," the centre insisted, the party was not "going over to the right" or 
executing a "drastic change of policy." Nor would it admit that previous tactics 
had been mistaken. Tactics had recently changed because the situation had 
changed. At every point, it insisted, tactics and line had been correct — 
although they had been incorrectly applied, with "a most sectarian method," 
during the period of "illegality." Responding to questions about the concept 
of social fascism, the party explained that this term referred to individuals who 
were socialists in words but fascists in deeds. The party did not repudiate the 
concept but rather confined it to a characterization of the "right wing" of social 
democracy — which in Canadian terms meant the CCF's national leadership 
— and declared that an alliance between communists and social democrats of 
the left and centre was possible and desirable. Ultimately, the letter concluded, 
the decisive question for the party was: who is the "main enemy?" The answer 
was clear: Fascism. The party fought for bourgeois democratic rights because 
it was a stepping stone to "Soviet democracy" and because the "vast masses 
of people revere the democratic traditions of their country and can be organ-
ized to defend same." 
This extract is an instructive source on the quality of internal party educa-
tion. At best, the letter may have provided the rank and file with an easily 
assimilable line. Used in debate, however, it must surely have been uncon-
vincing. Its cavalier treatment of party history (a practice that would become 
all too familiar) left rank and file members vulnerable to rivals with sharper 
memories. One can perhaps detect the hand of those who were constructing a 
cult of personality around Tim Buck in the admission (if such it can be called) 
that party tactics had been applied in a sectarian manner in the period of 
illegality. This periodization neatly absolved not only the Comintern and 
Moscow, but also every party leader who had served time in Kingston between 
1932 and 1934. Any suggestion that "Comrade Tim" could have perpetrated 
even a mis-application of a fundamentally correct line was inconceivable. In 
reality, he had become party leader largely because of his willingness to 
implement the Comintern's Class Against Class tactics. Under his leadership, 
the party had classified social democracy in general as social fascist. 
The RCMP concluded from this letter that "as reflected in the various 
movements for unity [cpc policy] is merely a tactical manoeuvre designed to 
defeat its immediate enemy — Fascism." If this analysis was perfectly 
reasonable, the RCMP did not stop to ponder whether the party had been forced 
to issue the letter at least partly because some members did not see Fascism 
as the "main enemy." When Stanley Ryerson addressed the Congress of the 
^^Bulletin 0842, 3 Febniary 1937. The party had earlier made this analysis of social 
fascism in its short book What the Communist Party Stands For (Toronto 1936). 
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Mexican CP as the CPC's fraternal representative, he identified Fascism as a 
genuine threat only in Québec. Who was the fascist enemy? The party 
leadership was not so foolish as to identify Fascism with Conservatism: the 
unabated electoral rout of the Conservatives demonstrated their lack of politi-
32 cal potency. Fascism, it seemed, equalled the "Hepbum-Duplessis Axis" 
supplemented by a handful of plutocratic "big shots," "the Bennetts, the Holts, 
the Financial Post, the Globe and Mail, etc." The party invited virtually 
everyone to the left of this rather puny aggregation to unite against it, a 
suggestion that seems to have struck some of its more intransigent members 
as the path to a dilution of the here and now struggle for working-class interests 
and Canadian socialism. One wonders whether some rank and filers — 
perhaps prompted by the Trotskyists, who made some significant appearances 
in the 1937 Bulletins — suspected that the CPC was determined to be the 
"saviour" of the bourgeoisie, as the French C? had been in the 1936 strike 
33 wave. 
Ill 
Grounds for such suspicion arose from the party's role in the burgeoning union 
movement. As ever, the party's contribution to labour struggles was un-
matched, but it collapsed itself into the movement, willingly accepting the role 
of uncritical auxiliary. Preaching that unity should be the working class's 
guiding principle, it sought to place organized labour at the centre of the 
heralded people's coalition: a million workers organized in a unified labour 
movement, the party insisted, would be a "Mighty instrument for the defense 
of the workingman, his family and the majority of the Canadian people." As 
we have seen, however, that "majority" extended far beyond the working class. 
The equivalent of the "Hepbum-Duplessis Axis" within the labour move-
ment was the "Green-Woll-Frey misleadership" of the American Federation 
of Labor (AFL). Against this triumvirate, the party seemed to exhaust all its 
militancy. In calling for maximum labour unity, it urged party members to 
carry the fight for the ciO and its continued membership of the Trades and 
Labour Congress (TLC) into their central labour councils and provincial labour 
federations (the AFL had suspended the ClO in November 1936). At a 
Bulletin 0842, 3 February 1937. On the electoral scene, sec E.R. Forbes and D.A. 
Muisc, eds.. The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Toronto 1993), oh. 8 and Gerald 
Friesen, 77»« Canadian Prairies: A history (Toronto 1987), ch. 15. 
Dennis McColl, "Hepburn" and Peter Quinn, "Duplessis," New Frontier, October 
1937. On Maurice Thorez, the French CP, and the Popular Front, see Femando Claudin, 
The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform (Harmondsworth 1975), 
199-207. 
^Daily Clarion, 18 March 1937, quoted in Bulletin 0849, 24 March 1937. The AFL 
Executive Council's suspension of the CIO in August 1936 was endorsed by the full 
AFL convention three months later. See The Depression Years, Part III. 1936, 523. 
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Montréal trade union fraction meeting, Alex Gault reported that the party had 
been able to come out locally with a "more precise and open cio line" precisely 
because local relationships between the CIO and TLC were so good. Other 
party members, however, doubted whether this era of good feelings would 
continue indefinitely. Not only was the AFL increasing the pressure on its 
Canadian officials to move against the "dualist" insurgents, but the CIO was 
undeniably undermining the AFL in Canada. In British Columbia, for example, 
within months of merging their WUL union with the Lumber and Sawmill 
Workers' Union (LSWU) section of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 
left-wing unionists joined like-minded Americans in a Federation of Wood-
workers and were discussing a split from the AFL union. As late as 9 June 1937 
the party was counselling against a break. One week later it underlined the 
volatility of the period (or perhaps the volatility of west coast communism) by 
deciding that the AFL's reactionary behaviour made a breakaway fully justi-
fied. The International Woodworkers of America (IWA) was formed in July. 
The IWA'S formation seems to have been one of those occasions when the 
BC provincial party "went its own merry way, ignoring, much to the conster-
nation of the national office, party policy and strategy whenever it saw fit." 
In general, the party leadership was desperate to avoid an AFL-CIO split and 
tried to combat the "fatalistic view" that this was inevitable. Its utilitarian view 
of unity led to its adopting a markedly tougher line on relations with the 
All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL). Since 1935 the CPC had always 
differentiated between the reactionary and progressive elements in the national 
union centre and had encouraged cooperation between the latter and the TLC. 
When the ACCL split at its 1936 convention, A.R. Mosher highlighted his 
"progressive" persona by publicly inviting John L. Lewis to ally the CIO and 
the ACCL. In 1937, however, the party worked out that if Mosher's initiative 
had succeeded (which, of course, it did in 1940), the TIX could not have 
resisted AFL pressure. The party duly altered its image of the ACCL, now 
arguing that its essential divisiveness could be seen in its attempts to "muscle 
in" on the Cio's steel and textiles drives. By calling on members to assist "the 
healthy unity movement" emerging among rank and file members of the AFL's 
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks (BRSC) and Mosher's Canadian 
Brotherhood of Railway Employees (CERE) and referring to the "isolated 
position of the CBRE and the ambiguous role played by the CBRE leaders" in 
"flu//erm Üf857, 27 May 1937. 
^^The Depression Years, Pan HI. 1936, 10; editorials, "We Can't Afford to Lose Our 
Head," "A Critical Situation," and "Green Changes Situation," B.C. Lumber Worker, 
19 May, 9, 16 June 1937. Sec also Abella, Nationalism, 112-3. 
Abella, Nationalism, 111. Abella docs not mention the party centre's view of the IWA 
breakaway. 
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recent railway wage negotiations, it served notice of its loyalty to international 
unionism. Aaron Mosher no doubt filed away this minor piece of treachery 
for future action. 
As the 1937 TLC convention approached, the CPC urged its members to work 
in their unions and labour councils to generate unity resolutions for submission 
to the convention and discourage resolutions that endorsed the CIO. "This," 
one directive pointed out, "is hardly necessary now." Moreover, in the present 
circumstances it could only be provocative. Communists should concentrate 
on winning support for resolutions that would not rile the craft traditionalists 
but would promote party causes, such as independent labour political action, 
the creation of a TLC Organization Department, support for "Bill 62" (J.S. 
Woodsworth's pursuit of a "Canadian Wagner Act"), and solidarity with 
Spanish republicanism. The party was delighted when the convention passed 
off with the CIO still on board, one member enthusing that the "handful of 
reactionaries who went... determined to cause a rift, did not get to first base." 
He, however, conveniently overlooked the hectic pre-convention politicking 
that that had been required to prevent a "bitter floor fight" and the fact that the 
price of unity was the lifting of any real pressure on the TLC to change its 
non-interventionist policy. 
The failure to energize the TLC was especially disappointing given the CIO's 
manifest failure to fulfil its early promise. The militant trend established 
towards the end of 1936 in strikes by the United Automobile Workers' (UAW) 
at Kelsey-Hayes Wheel, Windsor, the International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion (ILA) in Vancouver, and the United Textile Workers (UTW) at Empire 
Cottons, Weiland, continued into spring 1937. The Bulletins show in detail 
^*0n the ACCL split, see The Depression Years, Part III, 1936,424-26; Toronto Globe, 
30 September 1936; Labour Review, December 1936. For ACCL organizing in textiles, 
see Bulletin 0861, 23 June 1937; Alfred Edwards, "The Mill: A Workers' Memoir of 
the 1930s and 1940s," Labour/Le Travail, 36 (1995), 273-5, 278-82. 
^^Bulletin 0866, 5 August 1937; 0869, 9 September 1937; Abella, Nationalism, 28; 
Bulletin 0873, 13 October 1937. According to a report from Montréal, half the 140 
"progressive" delegates to the TLC convention were party members. "Bill 62" was J.S. 
Woodsworth's attempted amendment to the Criminal Code, to give Canadian trade 
unionists the de iure freedom from victimization theoretically guaranteed to American 
unionists by the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933) and the National Labor 
Relations Act (1935). The party did not mention Woodsworth's sponsorship of the 
Bill. See Kenneth McNaughl, A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.S. Woodsworth 
fToronto 1959), 293-4. 
John Manley, "Communists and Autoworkcrs: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism 
in the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1925-1936," Labour/Le Travail, 17 (1986), 
105-33; The Depression Years, Part HI. 1936,519, 539-9; Bulletin 0843, 10 February 
1937. 
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how Canadian workers were no less inspired by the new union force than their 
American counterparts. The first six months of the year produced a national 
strike wave, not only in the classic CIO mass production industries but also in 
less glamorous settings where the WUL had done some notable pioneering 
work, such as longshoring and water transport, furniture, garments, shoe and 
leather, and sawmilling. Through the Bulletins we witness such novelties as 
militant laundry workers, professionals seeking union organization, and the 
explosive militancy of Quebec's supposedly priest-ridden proletariat. We also 
see many reports of peaceful union growth. 
One inaccurate report suggested that the CIO was ready to back the Steel-
workers Oi^anization Committee's (SWOC) Canadian locals to the tune of 
$500,000. In fact, despite several similar suggestions of impending bounty, 
it swiftly became clear that, in the wake of the UAW's American triumph at 
GM, Flint, in February and SWOC's "Big Steel" contract in March, the CIO's 
American leaders — the left as much as the right — were determined to follow 
a policy of retrenchment whenever possible. Equally swiftly, the magic in the 
letters "CIO" started to wear off. As Irving Abella has shown, the union 
building that was carried on in the CIO's name owed virtually everything to 
the solidarity of Canadian labour. The CIO contributed little more than a potent 
mystique (important though that was) to the UAW's breakthrough at General 
Motors, Oshawa. Shortly after Oshawa, the CIO called together its industrial 
organizers from all the main industrial centres in Ontario to hear ClO Regional 
Industrial Director, Hugh Thompson, tell them that there was no prosjject of 
a general organizing drive in Canada. The RCMP's report makes no mention 
of the mood of the meeting, but one suspects it was sombre. The main business 
"decided" by the conference, attended by representatives of the CPC, YCL, the 
Cooperative Commonwealth Youth Movement (CCYM), and the CPC-led On-
tario Unemployed Federation, was that Canadian unions would henceforth 
"finance their own strikes as no money can be expected from the USA." With 
The Bulletins underscore the image of 1937 presented by Douglas Cruikshank and 
Gregory S. Kealey, "Sünkes in Canada, 1891-1950," Labour/U Travail, 20 (1987), 
85-145, especially 114-7. Robert Storey's contention that "The great dream of the CIO 
... had [after Oshawa] little or no immediate impact on Ontario or Canadian workers 
as a whole? is accurate only in the sense that there were no further organizing coups 
of a similar stature. Robert Storey, "Unionization versus Corporate Welfare: The 
'Dofasco Way'," Labour/U Travail, 12 (1983), 7-42. 
*^Bulletin 0840,20 January 1937. The sum Curtis mentioned was the total the CIO was 
allegedly prepared to make available for all SWOC's 1937 operations. Although very 
little of it crossed the border, it should be noted in SWOC's defence that what became 
known as the "Little Steel Süike" began on 26 May. With around 50,000 American 
stcclworkers out by early June, SWOC's half-million dollars were rapidly consumed. 
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no sense of irony, the meeting also agreed that all CIO locals should give 250 
per member to the Spanish Aid Fund and should be prepared to pay half the 
cost of sending to Spain any single unemployed members who wished to 
volunteer. The CIO's refusal to commit funds to Canada squandered the 
momentum of the auto strike and inevitably dissipated Canadian optimism. 
The party instantly adapted to the ClO's realpolitik. When SWOC members 
at Cuthbert's Plumbing Supplies in Montréal went on strike in June, its stand 
was remarkably censorious. Ignoring evidence of rank-and-file combativeness 
(a contact repwrted that the strikers' morale was high, with 98 of the plant's 
100 workers on strike, and predicted that the strike could be won given 
financial support from the CIO and other local unions), the party declared that 
the strike was "a serious mistake ... [which] should not have been called ... 
because of the apparent weakness of the union." Although it endorsed the view 
that the Montréal trade union movement would have to provide financial 
support to give the strike any chance of success, it seemed less concerned with 
building solidarity than with saving face with the American party, whose trade 
union leaders, it pointed out, would "lose all respect for the Canadian trade 
union section of the CP and [might] take the matter up with the higher bodies" 
if the CIO received any further appeals for financial aid. The Montréal CIO 
used dues payments from local members to support the strike, but after three 
weeks the workers were forced back without a settlement. Workers who 
continued to fight for recognition as CIO unionists, such as the coal miners of 
Minto, New Brunswick, discovered that their best allies were comrades in 
UMWA District 26. The CIO, Allen Seager notes, was "the proverbial giant with 
feet of clay." 
The CIO's missed chance can be traced through the Bulletins' detailed 
accounts of developments in the textiles industry. As noted earlier, the first 
major strike of 1937 started in late December 1936 at Empire Cottons in 
Weiland. UTW organizer and CPC member Alex Welch led 800 workers to a 
compromise settlement that included the workers' right to belong to a union 
of their own choice. The strike did not arise out of thin air. The Workers' 
Unity League and Young Communist League had achieved some success in 
textiles, mainly in small knitting mills, in 1933-34. After the liquidation of the 
WUL in 1936, the party worked to bring the UTW into Canada. The American 
*^Bulletin 0857, 27 May 1937; Abella, Nationalism; Daniel Benedict, "Goodbye to 
Homer Martin," Labour/Le Travail, 29 (1992), 117-55. 
**Bulletin 0863, 13 July 1937. 
*^Bulletin 0865, 28 July 1937. 
Allen Seager, "Minto, New Brunswick: A Study of Class Relations Between the 
Wars," Labour/Le Travail, 5 (1980), 117-24. 
*''Bulletin 0843, 10 February 1937. 
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union, however, after the cataclysmic defeat of mass strikes in New England 
and the Upper South in 1934, was initially too exhausted to offer more than 
its best wishes. Canadian communists responded by working through the 
Toronto District Labour Council, and as an interim measure organized a 
Textile Workers' Association in mid-1936. By July, when the first new 
Canadian UTWA local since the 1920s was formed in Toronto, Communist 
cadres were also probing the possibilities of unionizing textile workers in other 
Ontario towns. In August they had their first real strike success in Cornwall, 
where it formed another local at Courtauld's large rayon mill. Union organiz-
ers pressed home their advantage during 1937, leading strikes at Weiland, 
Ontario Silknit in Toronto (April-May), Dominion Woollens in Peterborough 
(June-August), and Canadian Cottons in Cornwall (July-August). 
Despite all the difficulties facing them, Canadian textile workers were 
clearly ready to organize and were "angered" to learn that Sidney Hillman had 
blocked plans to send the TWOC into Canada. Caught between the danger of 
alienating rank-and-file opinion and losing face with the ClO, the party devoted 
a full meeting of the National Trade Union Commission and part of an enlarged 
district bureau session to the textiles campaign before deciding to stand solidly 
behind the CIO. Party leaders knew that the ACCL was dipping a toe into the 
Ontario mills ("further splitting the ranks of the textile workers"), while in 
Québec the Catholic Syndicates presented a threat to militant unionism. 
Another possibility was that, having lost the UTW to the CIO, the AFL would 
launch a new union. The party decided that the membership should take the 
lead in organizing textile locals that could be affiliated to the CIO when it finally 
decided to move north. It proposed two alternatives, either a National Textile 
Workers' Union directly chartered by the TLC or the chartering of separate 
"federal" textile unions. In the latter part of 1937 the TLC set up the Canadian 
Textile Workers' Council, which by the end of 1938 operated as an umbrella 
for 10 textile locals. Meanwhile, cadres were to defend the TWOC by explaining 
the reasons behind its Canadian policy. "Under no conditions," the party 
ordered, "should the TWOC be criticised for their attitude toward Canada, since 
David Milton, The Politics of U.S. Labor: From the Great Depression to the New 
Deal (New York 1982), 62-5; Thomas MacMahon. "An Appeal to Canadian Workers," 
Daily Clarion, 25 July 1936; also reports in Daily Clarion, 3, 6 June 1936; The 
Depression Years, Pari HI. 1936, 12-3, 372-5; Bulletin 0854, 5 May 1937; #857, 27 
May; #862, 30 June; #865, 28 July; #867, 17 August. For a valuable account of the 
Peterborough strike, see Joan Sangster, Earning Respect: The Lives of Working Women 
inSmall-Town Ontario, 7 920-7 960 (Toronto 1995), 166-90. See also Ellen Scheinberg, 
"The Tale of Tessie the Textile Worker: Female Textile Workers in Cornwall During 
World War II," Labour/U Travail, 33 (1994), 160-1. 
*^Bulletin 0863, 13 July 1937; 0865, 28 July 1937. 
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this would play into the hands of the anti-CIO forces and the reactionary AFL 
leaders." 
The UTW strikes in Peterborough and Cornwall in June, July, and August 
suggested that it remained possible to hold the line for the cio in Ontario. In 
Québec, however, the party's traditional weakness could not compensate for 
the ClO's caution. Its base in the provincial textiles industry was tiny, and when 
10,000 Quebecers walked out of eight Dominion Textiles mills in August, 
under the leadership of the Catholic union, the party was confined to the 
sidelines. After a month of the most militant industrial conflict ever witnessed 
in Québec, the strikers returned to work at the behest of Cardinal J.M. Rodrigue 
Villeneuve, to await provincial mediation. Provincial party secretary Fred 
Rose, who had direct knowledge of French Canadian textiles workers and was 
one of the least sectarian of party leaders, refused to countenance a suggestion 
that the party campaign for the strikers to defect to a TLC union, since this 
might endanger the strike and discredit the TLC. He argued instead that the 
correct policy for the labour movement was to offer the Catholic union support 
and guidance, while the correct policy for the party unit was to agitate for 
rank-and-file unionism, with stronger picket lines and a more accountable 
leadership. The party adopted a philosophical outlook on its marginality to 
the Québec strikes (there were smaller but equally militant struggles at the 
Sorel shipyards and steel mills), viewing them as evidence of the inexorable 
growth of a general "movement towards struggle for a better life" by the 
French Canadian masses. 
This long view also underpinned the party ' s contemporary movement away 
from the classical Leninist position on trade union work. Between first 
encountering 'Left Wing' Communism: An Infantile Disorder in 1921 and the 
end of the 'Third Period' in 1934, the party remained more or less faithful to 
the principle that serious revolutionaries had to be involved as revolutionaries 
in the mass organizations of the class, actively leading rank and file unionists 
towards developed socialist consciousness. When, however, the party de-
cided to return to the international unions in November 1935, party leaders 
^^Bulletin 0863, 13 July 1937; 0865, 28 July 1937; Repon of the Royal Commission 
on the Textile Industry (Ottawa 1938), 186-7; Canada, Department of Labour, Report 
... for the Fiscal Year Ending 31 March 1937 (Ottawa 1937), 25-6. 
Bulletin 0867, 17 August 1937; Stuart Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest 
and Industrial Conflict in Canada. 1900-66 (Ottawa 1970), 262-3. The RCMP's report 
uses the term "AFL" for what is clearly meant to be the Montreal Trades and Labour 
Council and/or the CIO. 
"Bulletin 0869, 8 September 1937. 
^Even in the Third Period, when the CPC abandoned 'Left Wing ' Communism and 
withdrew from the mainstream unions, it did so in the expectation that its "red" unions 
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had hinted at a willingness to suspend the principles of rank-and-file unionism 
when they called for communists to become "responsible leading" unionists 
rather than "permanent oppositionists." They anticipated with relish a general 
growth of party influence in the CIO unions and a proliferation of communist 
trade union leaders and officials. In 1937, with such as Alex Welch and 
Arthur Laverty (UTW), Sidney Sarkin (Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Mon-
tréal), Dick Steele and Harry Hunter (SWOC), Harold Pritchett (IWA), and Pat 
Sullivan (Canadian Seamen's Union) all prominent figures, the party had to 
work out how — or even whether — these individuals should openly combine 
their union and party work; indeed the question of how all industrial cadres 
should conduct political work had to be confronted. 
The 1937 Bulletins suggest that the party deliberately chose to compart-
mentalize industrial and political activity and reduced the latter to the single 
task of building the party. At the same time as the party urged employed 
members to make building the CIO their premier responsibility, it also in-
structed them to "remember their Party discipline insofar as admitting Party 
affiliation. Never mention the Party." Similarly, while it recognized that 
prominent communists would find themselves acting as union organizers, it 
declared that "having a party functionary act in the dual capacity of union 
organizer and Party organizer [was]... a dangerous practice." Stewart Smith 
castigated party units in centres where the CIO was on the rise for letting 
party-building lag behind union-building. He also called for prominent com-
munists not to conceal their politics. Apparently identifying Alex Welch and 
Arthur Laverty as culprits, he argued that "to deny Communist affiliation ... 
was only playing into the hands of the 'red baiters' and could only make things 
difficult for the C.P." Nevertheless, there is no suggestion that he wanted 
communists to use their union positions as propaganda platforms. Against his 
continued complaints about leading union cadres who felt "that their respon-
sibilities to the building of the Party terminated when they became trade union 
officials," the accused seem to have felt that they were simply doing what was 
necessary to actualize the party's coalition-building aims. 
Towards a Canadian People's Front, Proceedings of the Ninth Plenum of the Central 
Committee, CPC (Toronto, November 1935), 31-8. The RCMP took particular note of 
local union leaders' party affiliations. It cited an Ottawa Journal (8 July 1937) report, 
which showed Cornwall union leader Arthur Laverty doing the party's bidding. Noting 
that Laverty had a measure of influence with TLC president Paddy Draper, the RCMP 
pointed out "how quickly the Communist Party apparatus can be put into operation and 
how the Party functions in disguise." 
^^Bulletin »856, 19 May 1937. 
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A reasonable case could be made for stressing the consolidation of the 
industrial unions. Even in the Third Period — when the struggle for socialism 
was supposedly on the immediate agenda — WUL organizers had tended to 
suppress political axe-grinding for the sake of building the red unions. If the 
Popular Front offered a more promising organizing context, red-baiting re-
mained common and many workers were still distrustful of communist mo-
tives. When UTW organizer and party member Alex Welch announced during 
the Ontario Silknit strike that the strikers' demand for union recognition 
referred simply to UTW local 2495 and not to the CIO, he was acknowledging 
that what made the CIO so attractive to unionizing workers could have the 
diametrically opposite effect on outsiders. Mitchell Hepburn had noted the 
ease with which nativist anti-communism had been whipped up amongst 
"white men" against alleged ClO "reds" at the Holmes Foundry strike in 
Samia-Point Edward, Ontario, in March' his hysterical attacks on the CIO did 
not prevent his re-election in October. The CIO was being built in a much 
less helpful legislative climate than in the United States. The beneficial effect 
of the Nova Scotia Trade Union Act on the organization of the DOSCO steel 
plant suggests what might have happened on a national scale if the King 
government had sponsored Woodsworth's Bill 62. In the real world of provin-
cial rights, however. Liberal sympathies were unpredictable. Where one 
Liberal provincial premier, Angus L. MacDonald, used legislation to cement 
working-class support in advance of a provincial election, another, T.D. 
Pattullo, celebrated re-election by passing the British Columbia Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, which actually weakened the bargaining 
position of organized labour — and then there was Hepburn. 
By explicitly ruling that socialism was no longer an immediate objective, 
the party acknowledged (arguably not before time) the necessity of striking a 
realistic balance between agency and structural constraints. But did the new 
realism go too far? The party perceived the CIO not only as "one of the main 
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methods of bringing forth a political consciousness of the working class" but 
also as the means of drawing together "a definite coalition.. of all progressive 
forces" behind the labour movement. Declaring that "only true communists" 
recognized that this crusade represented "our salvation and the establishment 
of the Workers' state," party leaders continued to see themselves as its unseen 
guiding force. In the short term, however, their priority was to build the 
coalition, and they were prepared to "tail" prospective allies to achieve it. 
IV 
We have seen how the party accepted the CIO's insistence that Canadians 
accept financial responsibility for building industrial unionism. It did not stop 
there. It also ordered members to downplay the issue of Canadian autonomy 
in the new unions for fear of offending the CIO, but at the same time predicted 
that, if the issue did arise, the clO would not oppose national autonomy 
anyway. Given John L. Lewis' record in the Nova Scotia and Alberta mining 
districts and the tight top-down control Lewis' right-hand men Philip Murray 
and Sidney Hillman were exerting over the steel and textiles campaigns, this 
was either disingenuous or wilfully forgetful. The party also dutifully echoed 
Lewis' belief that rank-and-file initiative could be centrally directed. Uncan-
nily echoing Maurice Thorez, it wagged an admonitory finger at Canadian 
workers' "spontaneous actions" and advised them to think before they acted. 
In particular, "whenever a sit-down strike is necessary and advisable, it 
requires the most careful preparation." When workers employed a "mechani-
cal adaptation of this important and delicate method of struggle," the party 
lectured, they harmed their own cause. 
We may wonder whether workers interpreted this advice as sound and 
practical or as a patronizing invitation to leave strike strategy to the experts. 
We may also wonder whether the party, which only ever made demands on 
the working class, did not wish to see the CIO become too threatening to 
potential sympathizers from the middle class. Communist leaders believed that 
Mitchell Hepburn's vigorous opposition to the CIO had inadvertently facili-
tated the creation of the much desired progressive coalition. If Hepburn could 
bid for the support of "backward" sections of the working class, they could 
"assist the Liberal groupings striving for a break" with Hepburn to converge 
around the CIO. As the party placed increasing emphasis on multi-class unity, 
it publicly abandoned its traditional vanguardist aspirations and voluntarily 
suspended criticism of potential Liberal allies. 
"flM//«m#S56, 19May 1937. 
"fi«//efm #86/, 23 June 1937. 
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In January, it was still possible to bait Ontario Health and Welfare minister 
David Croll (for allegedly swanning off to Hollywood to negotiate a film deal 
on the Dionne Quints when he should have been dealing with the problems of 
his unemployed constituents). By mid-year, however, with the party struggling 
to ingratiate itself with Liberal moderates, such criticism was unthinkable. 
Among those to whom it extended the hand of comradeship were Croll and 
Arthur Roebuck, who had both recently resigned from Hepburn's cabinet over 
his anti-labour policies, T. Duff Pattullo, and the Prime Minister himself. 
When Roebuck announced his intention to "speak with an independent voice 
... [and] pursue his stand in favour of labour rights and ... progressive legisla-
tion," Stewart Smith withdrew his own candidacy to give Roebuck a clear run 
in the Toronto Bellwoods provincial seat. The RCMP reported that "some 
understanding" had been reached between Roebuck and the party leadership, 
but it is doubtful if the former Attorney-General had to promise much. All 
W.L. MacKenzie King had to do to earn the party's plaudits was refuse to be 
"stampeded" into joining Hepburn's attack on the CIO and send a goodwill 
message to the Canadian Youth Congress, "a gesture appreciated by all 
progressives." Even after Pattullo's anti-labour Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act, the party leadership decided that he was not yet linked to the 
Hepbum-Duplessis Axis and rebuked the BC District Bureau for adopting an 
overly critical attitude towards him. 
As the CPC strengthened its contacts with bourgeois progressives (and even 
envisaged embracing "sections of the lower Conservative organizations"), it 
adopted an increasingly sharp attitude towards the CCF. A comprehensive 
account of the relationship between the CPC and the CCF in the late 1930s is 
yet another theme awaiting its historian. The Bulletins show that, whatever 
some of the dimmer reactionaries were saying about the "red" CCF, the Force 
the Popular Front, a decision he considers appropriate. Mark Naison adopts a more 
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knew that the CCF's national and (except in Saskatchewan) provincial leaders 
were anxious not to tamish their constitutionalist image by having any truck 
with communism. Norman Penner has argued that the CPC had "no success ... 
in improving its relations with most of the leaders, members and supporters 
of the CCF." There was still a significant minority of CCFers who found the 
electoralist calculations of Woodsworth and M.J. Coldwell profoundly frus-
trating and were prepared to defy official censure. The CCF's 1936 national 
convention had already tried to address their concerns by amending the party 
constitution "to allow for co-operation with any organization for the purpose 
of bettering the immediate interests of the common people," but many CCFers 
felt that their leaders' caution continued to harm both the party and the 
movement. Graham Spry resigned as Ontario provincial leader in April 1937 
because he had become demoralized by the national party's inadequate 
response to the industrial struggle from below. Everywhere, he lamented, 
"there is a demand for labour organizers, ... the cry 'labour party' ... a new 
attitude, a new public opinion, and everywhere the CCF is almost totally 
ineffective." 
The Bulletins reveal the contemporary balance of forces in the CCF, show-
ing on the one hand how the BC provincial executive refused any electoral 
collaboration in the provincial election and decided unanimously to suspend 
prominent party member (and provincial CLAWF secretary) A.M. Stephen for 
his "persistent advocacy of a People's Front" with the CPC and "Left Wing 
Liberals," while, on the other hand 40 per cent of the delegates at the BC 
provincial convention voted against Stephen's suspension. In Ontario, the 
provincial executive's ban on electoral pacts with the CPC in the October 
provincial election also produced internal strife. David Lewis and J.S. 
Woodsworth clashed sharply over the younger man's persistent objections to 
theCCF's refusal to give J.B. Salsberg a clear run at the St. Andrew's, Toronto, 
seat. When, as Lewis predicted, Salsberg fell only 179 votes short of victory, 
a number of Toronto CCFers defected to the CPC, having concluded that the 
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880 votes gained by CCF candidate Harry Simon had probably cost Salsberg 
the seat7^ 
With the CPC so clearly setting the movement's agenda, some top-level 
contact with the party simply could not be avoided. Among the notable CCFers 
prepared to appear on joint platforms at anti-fascist meetings. International 
Women's Day celebrations. May Day rallies and the like were Dorothy 
Steeves, Eugene Forsey, Lyle Telford, Dorisc Nielsen (who later defected to 
the CPC), Tommy Douglas, John Buckley (one of two CCFers on the Friends 
of the Soviet Union's 1937 delegation to the USSR), Lewis and Spry. When 
Norman Bethune's national fundraising tour reached BC, the CCF provincial 
leaders, whether through recognition of the popularity of his humanitarian 
work, solidarity with the Spanish Loyalist cause or simple politeness, chose 
to fete him at a reception in Steeves' home. Bethune, having just announced 
his party membership, repaid the CCFers hospitality by attacking their anti-
unity stand and trouncing the only (unfortunately unidentified) person pre-
pared to defend the CCF line. Elsewhere, socialists and communists naturally 
gravitated towards each other. In Windsor, the CCF southwestern Ontario 
regional council and the city CCF clubs joined with the CPC, CLWF, and Jewish, 
German and Italian cultural organizations to pledge $35 a week for the 
Bethune blood transfusion unit. A number of CCF clubs were hit by defec-
tions to the CPC. Some of the BC defectors who left in disgust at their leaders' 
laxness in eradicating 'Trotskyite filth" may well have been secret party 
members, but it is doubtful if the Reverend E.H. Baker, a provincial council 
member from Fraser Valley, fell into that category. He joined the CP simply 
because he needed to stand in "the vanguard of unity." 
Although Canada's labour rebellion had subsided by the end of 1937, a 
propensity towards working-class unity remained. As the Daily Clarion 
celebrated "increased labour-progressive representation" in municipal politics 
(and Tim Buck's moral victory in polling over 44,(X)0 votes in an unsuccessful 
bid for a seat on the Toronto Board of Control), CPC-CCF unity continued to 
break out. When veteran CCF leader S.J. Farmer presented the Manitoba 
legislature with a resolution calling for an embargo on trade with Japan, almost 
''^Bulletin 0872,5 October 1937; *873,13 October 1937. See Walter Young's account 
of the argument between Lewis and J.S. Woodsworth on this issue, The Anatomy of a 
Party, 267-8. Young does not mention the St. Andrew's result. Salsberg won the seat 
for the Labour-Progressive Party in 1943. 
'''^Bulletin 0849, 24 March 1937. 
''*Bulletin 0867, 17 August 1937. 
''^Bulletin 0844, 17 February 1937. 
''^Bulletin 0847, 10 March 1937; 0853, 28 April 1937. 
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2000 Winnipcgers turned out at a CLPD meeting to support his call. At the 
top, however, an apparently unbridgeable gulf continued to divide the two 
parties of the left. Neither party was blameless. If CCF leaders can be criticized 
for dissipating so much "energy... in a grinding series of accusations, hearings, 
and expulsions designed to maintain ideological purity, especially against the 
threat from the 'left,' and to find scapegoats for ... failures," the CPC, in its 
opportunist — and quite fanciful — pursuit of an alliance with Liberalism, 
gave up all too readily on the struggle to achieve socialist unity. There was 
always a tension in Dimitrov's conception of the Popular Front between the 
need to prepare the working class for a rapid transition from "the defensive to 
the offensive against capital" and the need to placate bourgeois allies by 
holding the mass movement back: the CPC had seemingly resolved it by the 
simple expedient of forgetting the first priority. 
'^Bulletin 0878, 10 December 1937; ̂ f879, 22 December 1937. 
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